Philosophical Pathologies and the Point of Inquiry
Duration: 37 mins 18 secs
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About this item
| Description: | A talk given by Pablo Hubacher Haerle at the Moral Sciences Club on 28th October 2023 |
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| Created: | 2024-01-18 16:05 |
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| Collection: | Moral Sciences Club |
| Publisher: | University of Cambridge |
| Copyright: | Faculty of Philosophy |
| Language: | eng (English) |
| Abstract: | Some people experiencing obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) or generalized anxiety disorder (GAD) are engaged in excessive worries about specific questions; they are inquirers. It is widely accepted in psychiatry that there is something deeply irrational about these sorts of anxious worries. However, the proposed accounts of what makes such worries irrational aren’t convincing. I argue for a novel answer based on a new norm for inquiry: the Success Norm for Inquiry. I show how this norm falls out of attractive positions in theory of action, metaepistemology and the debate about the constitutive aim of inquiry. Not only does the Success Norm help to see what’s irrational about OCD- or GAD-worries, it also, I suggest, affords us a new reply to the philosophical sceptic. |
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