Sacha Golob: Kant, Perception and Disjunctivism
Duration: 47 mins 30 secs
Share this media item:
Embed this media item:
Embed this media item:
About this item
| Description: |
This a talk from 'Intentionality: New Directions', a workshop on intentionality, the mind’s capacity to represent the world. The workshop took place at Peterhouse, Cambridge, 21-23 March 2017, as part of the New Directions in the Study of the Mind project, supported by the John Templeton Foundation.
Image: Compass Study, Calsidyrose. |
|---|
| Created: | 2017-04-08 14:17 |
|---|---|
| Collection: | Intentionality: New Directions |
| Publisher: | University of Cambridge |
| Copyright: | Faculty of Philosophy |
| Language: | eng (English) |
| Abstract: | Over the last thirty years, Kant’s work on perception has been successively read as endorsing conceptualist representationalism, non-conceptualist representationalism and naïve realism. I argue that, for all the ground covered, these readings are either partial or mistaken. In the first half of the paper, I review some of the key textual issues, in particular the first Critique’s stance on veridicality conditions and the Anthropology’s account of imagination. In the second half, I argue that this evidence supports a new account of Kant’s relationship to contemporary disjunctivism, one closely tied to his broader theory of mind. |
|---|---|