Conversation with Toshio Yamagishi, Sapporo
Duration: 1 hour 33 mins
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About this item
Description: | Filmed on 25rh March 2006 |
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Created: | 2020-02-14 17:35 |
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Collection: | JAPAN VISIT 2006 |
Publisher: | University of Cambridge |
Copyright: | Prof Alan Macfarlane |
Language: | eng (English) |
Transcript
Transcript:
Summary of conversation with Toshio Yamagishi
00:00 Explains his work; games of trust and prisoner's dilemma etc.
Attractive males less co-operative than others; does not exist between females. Attractive females often more co-operative etc (Alan). An example of evolutionary mating (short-term) choices. Males make choices of long-term mating patterns. Better for female to good genes. Attractiveness a good indicator of fitness. Poor genes creates asymmetry.
05:30 Interested in humans as a co-operative species. The economists assumption is not really true - not simple-minded pursuit of narrow self-interest. Something in the brain to make us a co-operative species.
7:30 - other work on culture and institutions, as in institutional economics. Self-sustaining systems of beliefs. The way people think are adaptive tools for social life - maintained through incentive structures. Americans are more co-operative than Japanese - contrary to common sense. Americans more trustful than Japanese. Co-operation and trust not to do so much with culture. What incentives collectively create, make them co-operate. In Japan has made such institutions. When Japanese are embedded in a social structure in which they are monitored and sanctioned, then they co-operate very well.
14:12 Kenichi asks about co-operation in America. General trust beyond the people you can control, the Americans have more trust. When you encounter social uncertainty, best to create reciprocal relations. Transaction costs are small within a small bounded group. But there is an opportunity cost to deal with outsiders - when this becomes large, need to create a solution. Need to develop a formal universal legal system. European C12 traders. Maghrebi traders. They hired only their own kind as their agents. In the C12 the hegemony moved to Genoa, where they did it in a different way - not closed boundaries, but Genovese more universalistic, city government and legal institutions, more expensive, but the advantage that outsiders were willing to trade with the Genovese, because they could depend on the legal system. Rather similar to Japanese collectivism, which reduced transaction costs, but for 20 years greater opportunity costs.
Nowadays China has a weak legal system, so people are afraid. If a strong collectivist group, no need to trust people - a yakuza system. Which explains why mafia comes after collapse of central government.
Edo merchant guilds, kobu-nakama. Bond association. In Edo period, very little civil jurisdiction. So the merchants had to create their own.
So very similar to Maghrebi traders with strong boundaries.
25:46 two times in Edo period banned these groups - had to bring them back, because trade became impossible. Throughout Japan. Alan talks about Kojunsha club. Now we are facing a time of change from collectivist ethics to something else, from loyalty to the group.
29:30 - what about China? China often called collectivist, but different collectivism, based more on personal ties, rather than groups. China more centralized - Emperor and bureaucrats, rather than self-government of Japan in feudal period. The family relations much stronger in China.
What is trust? Kenichi asks. Talks about travelling medicine dealers, once a year, a trust with householders.
Trust is different from assurance - assurance is incentive based, as mafia boss has assurance. Trust is based on belief that your partner will co-operate without threat.
34:10 Reference letters in Japan of no value as information - but it is important as guarentor. A sort of assurance - if bad person sent etc. In the US, a reference more about information. Sending of students elsewhere. Discussion of market ethics etc. Chinese system based on personal relation, Japan more generalized within group boundaries that expand or shrink, yet heavily based on assurance that once you betray you will be ostracized. In Japan you will find things again as foreigners.
41:33: many cultural behaviours are default strategies, eg. two experiments, if you ask how good you are, above or below average - in America think above average, Japanese say below average. In Japan the self is inter-dependent, rather than American independence. Japanese are self-effacing and self-critical. Alan gives an example of linguistic convention. Story of Fred Sanger. Did experiment with fake intelligence test, asked if above or below average. Offer of money to Japanese made them place themselves above average. Default strategy, say below. If given a reason to talk about yourself, then think themselves.
46:58 Alan asks about generalized trust. A double system. Very strong small group assurance co-operativeness, but also a market generalized system, very trusting of strangers. Compare to lack of general distrust, southern Italy or India. Trust family, but don't trust strangers. Japanese a double system. Americans have only generalized trust. In a market system, cannot be constrained in your group. In one situation I set up, if there were sanctions, then Japanese co-operated more. Alan suggests the individualistic Americans, Tocqueville's associationalism, lot of co-operative. In Japanese case a vertical power system, if there is some verticality, some form of power, authority structure, people know how to work together very well. Needs a firmer structure. Either vertical control, or mutual monitoring.
00:52:50 If you are strong believer in Christianity or whatever, then you can attract people. Placement of students. In Japan people try to recruit their students, partly because if they didn't, then their students have nowhere to go. If you recruit the best one - treated as an awful Professor. Professor who acts in universalistic way, you get a bad ethical reputation. In the US the opposite. Talks of his own experience, in appointing on an universalistic way. Alan talks about the half-way systems.
59:50 Alan on absence of formal law, yet there is still a double system, various collectivities, a good deal of mutual trust of strangers and honesty. How is it maintained? Travellers in remote areas. A lone woman quite safety. No civil law, but criminal law was very severe. Fukuzawa on honesty of Chinese and British traders. From middle of Edo, Mitsukoshi a standard quality and universal.
01:05:0 Alan asks about God and divine sanctions - Quakers and Nonconformists very trustworthy - God will see into your heart - an internalized monitor of trust in their hearts - lying, cheating etc. You trust another Christian bound by relation to God. If no internalized religion in Japan, no added sanction. Also Japan different from the meritorious religions of India/Tibet. He doesn't know. Some think Japanese talk about bushido ethics, integrity etc. Might produce same effects. Sarah comments. Alan on short-term and longer-term advantages - religion tips the balance. Talks about worms picking up. We cannot throw away our religious background.
Alan - the whole point about trust is that it cannot be enforced, making a leap of faith, generalized rather than direct exchange. No sanctions at all. Describes Maitland's theories of the origins of the trust. Legal devices, the essence was that you entrusted things, but through hope and friendship and religious background. Trust in strangers in England.
A legal accident. Sarah explains a personal trust and how it works. 01:17:40 Alan discusses the dual economy as Sakurai, a dual economy of trust. You trust all Japanese up to a certain level, then very strong little groups of a personal kind. Gives it an unusual flavour - which gives it an unusual flavour from other systems which have either one or the other. How can universalistic trust itself in Japan? Linked to the market system. Money penetrated, underpinned by the political system. How can an unrelated Japanese - a single woman wandering through a forest - quite safe. Nowadays, another Japanese, common culture and islandhood. If you met another Englishman - probably trust. A commonality. A nation state. Unlike Italy - complete distrusting. Usually start with the premise of untrustworthiness. You don't trust authority. You don't trust the class system. Don't trust other villages or families - a world of extreme suspicion. Exceptions, recent Anglo-American system, but also Japan moderately trusting and trustworthy. Not just a whole set of limited trust. Kenichi distinguishes markets and safety. Criminal trust, very strong. A kind of spy country. The origin of the market quite different - exchanging in the silent trade between mountain and valley people. Temples and monks as moneylenders. Reputation for honesty becomes important in late medieval period. Rather widespread merchant commonwealth.
01:26:30 Japanese both collective and individualistic. In Japanese hotel, people stand alone in lobby - very separate, unless people organized to work together. Much more individualistic in Japan. Americans less individualistic, in fact. Or rather no difference, if anything the Americans more collectivist than Japanese. The main difference is group category. In the US, the identification of the individual with the group - stronger there than in Japan. Japanese and American collectivism are qualitatively different. That in Japan based on networks. Americans tend to identify themselves with the group category. e.g. patriotism, or school, or football team. Japanese more relational and one to one. Two kinds of collectivism - one is face to face (Japanese), while Americans are much more abstract. If you have a personal acquaintance, leads to trust. Importance of personal ties.
00:00 Explains his work; games of trust and prisoner's dilemma etc.
Attractive males less co-operative than others; does not exist between females. Attractive females often more co-operative etc (Alan). An example of evolutionary mating (short-term) choices. Males make choices of long-term mating patterns. Better for female to good genes. Attractiveness a good indicator of fitness. Poor genes creates asymmetry.
05:30 Interested in humans as a co-operative species. The economists assumption is not really true - not simple-minded pursuit of narrow self-interest. Something in the brain to make us a co-operative species.
7:30 - other work on culture and institutions, as in institutional economics. Self-sustaining systems of beliefs. The way people think are adaptive tools for social life - maintained through incentive structures. Americans are more co-operative than Japanese - contrary to common sense. Americans more trustful than Japanese. Co-operation and trust not to do so much with culture. What incentives collectively create, make them co-operate. In Japan has made such institutions. When Japanese are embedded in a social structure in which they are monitored and sanctioned, then they co-operate very well.
14:12 Kenichi asks about co-operation in America. General trust beyond the people you can control, the Americans have more trust. When you encounter social uncertainty, best to create reciprocal relations. Transaction costs are small within a small bounded group. But there is an opportunity cost to deal with outsiders - when this becomes large, need to create a solution. Need to develop a formal universal legal system. European C12 traders. Maghrebi traders. They hired only their own kind as their agents. In the C12 the hegemony moved to Genoa, where they did it in a different way - not closed boundaries, but Genovese more universalistic, city government and legal institutions, more expensive, but the advantage that outsiders were willing to trade with the Genovese, because they could depend on the legal system. Rather similar to Japanese collectivism, which reduced transaction costs, but for 20 years greater opportunity costs.
Nowadays China has a weak legal system, so people are afraid. If a strong collectivist group, no need to trust people - a yakuza system. Which explains why mafia comes after collapse of central government.
Edo merchant guilds, kobu-nakama. Bond association. In Edo period, very little civil jurisdiction. So the merchants had to create their own.
So very similar to Maghrebi traders with strong boundaries.
25:46 two times in Edo period banned these groups - had to bring them back, because trade became impossible. Throughout Japan. Alan talks about Kojunsha club. Now we are facing a time of change from collectivist ethics to something else, from loyalty to the group.
29:30 - what about China? China often called collectivist, but different collectivism, based more on personal ties, rather than groups. China more centralized - Emperor and bureaucrats, rather than self-government of Japan in feudal period. The family relations much stronger in China.
What is trust? Kenichi asks. Talks about travelling medicine dealers, once a year, a trust with householders.
Trust is different from assurance - assurance is incentive based, as mafia boss has assurance. Trust is based on belief that your partner will co-operate without threat.
34:10 Reference letters in Japan of no value as information - but it is important as guarentor. A sort of assurance - if bad person sent etc. In the US, a reference more about information. Sending of students elsewhere. Discussion of market ethics etc. Chinese system based on personal relation, Japan more generalized within group boundaries that expand or shrink, yet heavily based on assurance that once you betray you will be ostracized. In Japan you will find things again as foreigners.
41:33: many cultural behaviours are default strategies, eg. two experiments, if you ask how good you are, above or below average - in America think above average, Japanese say below average. In Japan the self is inter-dependent, rather than American independence. Japanese are self-effacing and self-critical. Alan gives an example of linguistic convention. Story of Fred Sanger. Did experiment with fake intelligence test, asked if above or below average. Offer of money to Japanese made them place themselves above average. Default strategy, say below. If given a reason to talk about yourself, then think themselves.
46:58 Alan asks about generalized trust. A double system. Very strong small group assurance co-operativeness, but also a market generalized system, very trusting of strangers. Compare to lack of general distrust, southern Italy or India. Trust family, but don't trust strangers. Japanese a double system. Americans have only generalized trust. In a market system, cannot be constrained in your group. In one situation I set up, if there were sanctions, then Japanese co-operated more. Alan suggests the individualistic Americans, Tocqueville's associationalism, lot of co-operative. In Japanese case a vertical power system, if there is some verticality, some form of power, authority structure, people know how to work together very well. Needs a firmer structure. Either vertical control, or mutual monitoring.
00:52:50 If you are strong believer in Christianity or whatever, then you can attract people. Placement of students. In Japan people try to recruit their students, partly because if they didn't, then their students have nowhere to go. If you recruit the best one - treated as an awful Professor. Professor who acts in universalistic way, you get a bad ethical reputation. In the US the opposite. Talks of his own experience, in appointing on an universalistic way. Alan talks about the half-way systems.
59:50 Alan on absence of formal law, yet there is still a double system, various collectivities, a good deal of mutual trust of strangers and honesty. How is it maintained? Travellers in remote areas. A lone woman quite safety. No civil law, but criminal law was very severe. Fukuzawa on honesty of Chinese and British traders. From middle of Edo, Mitsukoshi a standard quality and universal.
01:05:0 Alan asks about God and divine sanctions - Quakers and Nonconformists very trustworthy - God will see into your heart - an internalized monitor of trust in their hearts - lying, cheating etc. You trust another Christian bound by relation to God. If no internalized religion in Japan, no added sanction. Also Japan different from the meritorious religions of India/Tibet. He doesn't know. Some think Japanese talk about bushido ethics, integrity etc. Might produce same effects. Sarah comments. Alan on short-term and longer-term advantages - religion tips the balance. Talks about worms picking up. We cannot throw away our religious background.
Alan - the whole point about trust is that it cannot be enforced, making a leap of faith, generalized rather than direct exchange. No sanctions at all. Describes Maitland's theories of the origins of the trust. Legal devices, the essence was that you entrusted things, but through hope and friendship and religious background. Trust in strangers in England.
A legal accident. Sarah explains a personal trust and how it works. 01:17:40 Alan discusses the dual economy as Sakurai, a dual economy of trust. You trust all Japanese up to a certain level, then very strong little groups of a personal kind. Gives it an unusual flavour - which gives it an unusual flavour from other systems which have either one or the other. How can universalistic trust itself in Japan? Linked to the market system. Money penetrated, underpinned by the political system. How can an unrelated Japanese - a single woman wandering through a forest - quite safe. Nowadays, another Japanese, common culture and islandhood. If you met another Englishman - probably trust. A commonality. A nation state. Unlike Italy - complete distrusting. Usually start with the premise of untrustworthiness. You don't trust authority. You don't trust the class system. Don't trust other villages or families - a world of extreme suspicion. Exceptions, recent Anglo-American system, but also Japan moderately trusting and trustworthy. Not just a whole set of limited trust. Kenichi distinguishes markets and safety. Criminal trust, very strong. A kind of spy country. The origin of the market quite different - exchanging in the silent trade between mountain and valley people. Temples and monks as moneylenders. Reputation for honesty becomes important in late medieval period. Rather widespread merchant commonwealth.
01:26:30 Japanese both collective and individualistic. In Japanese hotel, people stand alone in lobby - very separate, unless people organized to work together. Much more individualistic in Japan. Americans less individualistic, in fact. Or rather no difference, if anything the Americans more collectivist than Japanese. The main difference is group category. In the US, the identification of the individual with the group - stronger there than in Japan. Japanese and American collectivism are qualitatively different. That in Japan based on networks. Americans tend to identify themselves with the group category. e.g. patriotism, or school, or football team. Japanese more relational and one to one. Two kinds of collectivism - one is face to face (Japanese), while Americans are much more abstract. If you have a personal acquaintance, leads to trust. Importance of personal ties.
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