Bank Networks: Contagion, Systemic Risk and Prudential Policy

Duration: 1 hour 3 mins

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Description:	Faia, E (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt) Monday 15 December 2014, 16:00-16:45


Created:	2014-12-19 13:06
Collection:	Systemic Risk: Mathematical Modelling and Interdisciplinary Approaches
Publisher:	Isaac Newton Institute
Copyright:	Faia, E
Language:	eng (English)


Abstract:	Co-authors: Inaki Aldasoro (Goethe University Frankfurt), Domenico Delli Gatti (Catholic University Milan) We present a network model of the interbank market in which optimizing risk averse banks lend to each other and invest in non-liquid assets. Clearing takes place through a price tâtonnement mechanism, while traded quantities ate obtained through three alternative matching algorithms: Maximum Entropy, Closest matching and Random matching. Contagion occurs through liquidity hoarding, interbank interconnections and fire sale externalities. The resulting network configurations exhibits core-periphery structure, dis-assortative behavior and low clustering coefficient. We measure systemic importance with network centrality and input-output metrics and systemic risk with Shapley values. Given the realm of our network we analyze the effects of prudential policies on the stability/efficiency trade-off. Liquidity requirements unequivocally decrease systemic risk but at the cost of lower efficiency (measured by aggregate investment in non-liquid assets); equity requirements tend to reduce risk (hence increase stability) without reducing significantly overall investment.

Abstract:

Co-authors: Inaki Aldasoro (Goethe University Frankfurt), Domenico Delli Gatti (Catholic University Milan)

We present a network model of the interbank market in which optimizing risk averse banks lend to each other and invest in non-liquid assets. Clearing takes place through a price tâtonnement mechanism, while traded quantities ate obtained through three alternative matching algorithms: Maximum Entropy, Closest matching and Random matching. Contagion occurs through liquidity hoarding, interbank interconnections and fire sale externalities. The resulting network configurations exhibits core-periphery structure, dis-assortative behavior and low clustering coefficient. We measure systemic importance with network centrality and input-output metrics and systemic risk with Shapley values. Given the realm of our network we analyze the effects of prudential policies on the stability/efficiency trade-off. Liquidity requirements unequivocally decrease systemic risk but at the cost of lower efficiency (measured by aggregate investment in non-liquid assets); equity requirements tend to reduce risk (hence increase stability) without reducing significantly overall investment.

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